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And yet, the privilege in most of its aspects seems well worth
preserving. It is best defended, not as an unchangeable principle
of universal justice, but as a doctrine proved by experience to be
expedient in most cases.23
WEND= r~rS. WMLIAs
HOLOGRAPHIC CODICILS INCORPORATING BY
REFERENCE AND REPUBLISHING INVALID
NON-HOLOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTS
The result reached in a recent case in Oklahoma, Johnson v.
Johnson,1 suggests the need of re-examining the status of the law
as to holographic codicilhiary incorporation by reference and re-
publication.
The case was briefly this: The testator typed numerous be-
quests and devises on a single sheet of paper. This typewritten
portion was not dated, nor did the testator sign his name at the
conclusion thereof, nor was it attested by two witnesses. At the
end of the typewritten portion and on the same page the testator
wrote the following in his handwriting: "To my brother James I
give Ten Dollars only. This will shall be complete unless here-
after altered, changed or rewritten." He signed and dated the
latter, but it was not attested.2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court" held that the written portion
of the instrument constituted a valid holographic codicil which
incorporated the typewritten portion by reference and republished
and validated it as a valid will, as of the date of the codicil. The
court, in upholding the entire sheet of paper as a valid will, re-
lied on the general principle of law that a codicil which is validly
executed will operate as a republication of an earlier will regard-
less of defects which may have existed in the execution of the
earlier document.4 In order to apply this doctrine to the case, the
Oklahoma court concluded that the earlier typewritten portion
was a will although not signed, that the written portion being
See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908).
1279 P. 2d 928 (Okla. 1955).
'Id. at 929.
'Although the decision was styled as a Per Curiam decision, it was rendered
by a 5-8 vote upholding the validity of the will.
' Supra note 1, at 931.
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wholly in the handwriting of the testator was a valid holographic
codicil, which under the general rule republishes the typewritten
portion by incorporating it under the doctrine of incorporation
by reference. Indeed, there is a general principle of law that a
codicil has the effect of reviving and republishing the terms of an
invalid will,5 but in order to have that force the codicil, being an
appendage to and construed as part of the original will, must
refer to the will in such a way as to leave no doubt as to the
identity of that instrument. The codicil must in no sense be de-
pendent for its validity upon the will in conjunction with which
it was intended by the testator to be operative.6
It is well settled that for the purpose of determining the
testamentary intention, a will and its codicils are regarded as a
single and entire instrument taking effect at the time of testator's
death.7 They are construed together as if they had been executed
at the time of the making of the codicil.8 Thus a duly executed
codicil operates as a re-execution of the original defective will
and makes it valid from the date of the codicil.9 This principle
rests upon the theory that a proper execution of the codicil ex-
tends to the prior will and since in theory the two instruments
are incorporated as one, the subsequent execution makes both
instruments valid.' ° While for purposes of construction a codicil
and the will to which it relates are to be considered as a single
instrument, such is not the case where the question relates to the
formality of execution. Then both instruments are to be con-
sidered separately and the validity of execution in respect to one
"Twenty-two states and England so hold. For citation of cases see 21 A.L.R.
2d 823 (1952). That a properly executed codicil will give effect to a will which
was not validly executed has been specifically held in Kentucky. See Beall v.
Cunningham, 42 Ky. 390 (1843); Hurley v. Blankenship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.
2d 963 (1950).
6Slaughter's Adm'r. v. Wyman, 228 Ky. 226, 230, 14 S.W. 2d 777, 779
(1929). There is authority for thetproposition that a codicil may be probated
as an independent instrument when the will to which it refers has been rendered
inoperative by law, as by subsequent marriage. But the codicil must be com-
plete in itself as to be capable of execution and not dependent upon the will to
which it attempts to refer. In re Pardy's Estate, 291 N.Y.S. 969, 976 (1936).
Breekinridge v. Breckinridge's Ex'rs., 264 Ky. 82, 94 S.W. 2d 283 (1936).
8In New York a properly executed codicil validates a will originally invalid
for want of testamentary capacity, undue influence, or revocation but does not
validate a will defectively executed because of improper attestation. It will be
noted, however, that Justice Cardozo in Re Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611,
612 (1918), stated that the rule was malleable and uncertain and should be
abandoned.
Hurley v. Blankenship, Supra note 5.' See 57 Af. Jtu. 429 (1948).
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is not conclusive in respect to the other. The original will is not
rendered invalid by reason of the failure to have a codicil properly
executed. On the other hand, a codicil, if properly executed, can
operate to validate a defective will by either re-executing the will,
or by the doctrine of incorporation by reference. In either case
it is a rule of imputed intention, and therefore all the circum-
stances must be consistent with an intention to validate the
previously defective will,"- or to re-execute a previously revoked
will.'
2
The courts often speak in terms of revival and republication
in such cases even in jurisdictions where publication is not es-
sential to validate a will at its inception. 3 The term "revivar'
implies that the instrument revived once had testamentary life
but before the execution of the codicil it had for some reason
become void. "Republication" is the re-execution of a valid will
or codicil, the effect of which is to give it added force and is a
restatement of those valid and existing testamentary instruments
to which the codicil applies.' Frequently these terms are used
in the same sense and when courts refer to revival and republica-
tion they are actually referring to re-execution.
When a holographic will is not signed originally and the
testator later writes his signature in a codicil appearing on the
same sheet of paper, it would seem that a re-execution rather than
an incorporation or republication results, and the instrument if
wholly in the writing of the testator would be a valid holographic
will.'5 If the will was not originally in the handwriting of the
testator and was invalid, it may be incorporated into another
valid instrument and become operative as a part of that instru-
ment, but the subsequent instrument cannot revive or republish
that which never had life. Therefore in the Johnson case' if the
holographic writing could be said to validate the typewritten por-
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Vivian, 294 Ky. 390, 171 S.W. 2d 987
(1943).1 Ky. Ev. STAT. Sec. 394.100 provides that a revoked will can only be re-
vived by a re-execution in same manner as a will is executed.
I Some jurisdictions require that the testator declare to the attesting witnesses
that the instrument being executed is his will. See 14 IowA L. REv. 1, 14 (1928).
Kentucky has no statutory requirement as to publication and it has generally been
held that the witnesses need not be familiar with the contents of the will.
Singleton v. Singleton, 269 Ky. 330, 107 S.W. 2d 273 (1937).
" Evans, Testamentary Republication, 40 HAnv. L. IEv. 71, 72 (1926).
Beall v. Cunningham, Supra note 5. '" Supra note 1.
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tion appearing on the same page, it could properly speaking have
validated it only by incorporating it into the valid written portion.
Yet courts have often applied the doctrine that a valid codicil
republishes and revives an instrument which was not an effective
will because of incapacity or undue influence'17 or want of proper
execution. 8 These decisions can be justified on the theory of
incorporation by reference in that the subsequent codicil in-
corporates the invalid instrument and makes it speak as of the
date of the valid codicil as a valid testamentary disposition.19
A document is said to be incorporated by reference into a will
if all of the following requirements are met: (1) the will must
refer to and identify the document with reasonable certainty,
(2) the will must show the testator's intention to make the docu-
ment part of the will, (8) the will must refer to the document as
being in existence at the time of execution of the will and (4) the
document must be shown to be the one referred to in the will.20
Incorporation by reference should be distinguished from re-
publication as incorporation arises where instruments which have
never had testamentary life are given testamentary effect through
incorporation by proper reference in a subsequently executed
valid will or codicil; whereas republication applies to incorpora-
tion and republishing of instruments which, either at the time of
the codicil or at some other time, had been validly executed.21
As most jurisdictions recognize this doctrine, the result of giving
effect to the earlier instrument is therefore justified although the
terminology may be faulty.
22
A more difficult question is whether an holographic will should
be allowed to incorporate by reference non-holographic docu-
ments and validate the entire disposition as a valid will. Although
this situation can only arise in the jurisdictions which allow the
probate of holographic wills23 there is a conflict as to the applica-
" Farmers Bank and Trust Company v. Harding, 209 Ky. 3, 272 S.W. 3
(1925). But if the undue influence continues to exist at the time the subsequent
instrument is executed it will not validate the will.
Hurley v. Blankenship, supra note 5, at 52.
19 Evans, op. cit., supra note 14, at 73.
'Daniel v. Tyler's Estate, 296 Ky. 808, 178 S.W. 2d 411 (1948). See also
ATmKNSON, WILLS 387 (1953).
Evans, op. cit., supra note 14, at 72.
22 AT=xNsoN, op. cit, supra note 20, at 392.
m There are nineteen states that allow holographic instruments to be probated
as wills. Nine of these treat these wills as "an exceptional kind of written will
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tion of the doctrine of incorporation to the holographic will
statutes.
The California courts have consistently allowed an holographic
will or codicil to incorporate by reference documents not wholly
written by the testator, even though its statutes provide that an
holographic will must be wholly in the handwriting of the testator
to be valid. In the leading case of In Re Soher's Estate,24 the
testator executed an invalid attested will, later adding an holo-
graphic codicil. The California court allowed the will to be pro-
bated and said that the extrinsic document did not as a matter of
physical fact become part of the holographic will. The fiction of
regarding such a document as part of the will is to aid in its con-
struction and should not be extended to reach unjust con-
sequences.
In Hewes v. Hewes2 5 the Mississippi court took the opposite
position. In that case the testatrix executed two invalid formal
wills, later writing a letter wholly in her handwriting mentioning
both invalid wills. The court held that since the letter was un-
attested it could not incorporate anything not wholly in the testa-
tor's handwriting. The court concluded that to allow incorpora-
tion by reference in this type of situation would contravene the
statute, as the extrinsic document becomes part of the will and
would be valid only if wholly in the handwriting of the testator.
Since Sharp v. Wallace26 was decided in 1886, the accepted
rule in Kentucky has been that an unattested codicil, although
wholly in the handwriting of the testator, cannot bring into opera-
tion as a will a paper which is neither in the handwriting of the
testator nor attested, as required by statute. The position of the
Kentucky court has been based on the theory that since the non-
holographic instrument is not attested nor in the handwriting of
the testator and since that portion and the codicil together make
rather than in a class by themselves". In the other ten states, including Kentucky,
holographic wills are a distinct type of will. All nineteen states require the holo-
graphic will to be wholly in the handwriting of the testator. 14 IowA L. REv. 1,
25 (1928).
2'78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8 (1889).
S110 Miss. 826, 71 So. 4 (1916).
83 Ky. 584 (1886). See also, Blankenship v. Blankenship, 276 Ky. 707, 124
S.W. 2d 1060 (1939); Adams Exr. v. Beaumont, 226 Ky. 311, 10 S.W. 2d 1106
(1928).
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up one will, it must be wholly in the handwriting of the testator
to satisfy the statutory requirement."
In the recent case of Scott v. Gastright28 the Kentucky court
reaffirmed this position. In that case the testatrix wrote and
signed a memorandum which stated, "The will I dictated to H.
Schear Atty, but did not sign is my last will and as I wish it."
The court denying probate of both instruments stated: "Neither
of the two instruments which are sought to be probated as a will
in this case was acknowledged before, or signed by subscribing
witnesses. On the other hand, the two instruments were not
wholly written by Mrs. Gastright. Such being the case, these in-
struments taken together do not fulfill the requirements of the
statute .... 29 Although the Kentucky court has followed a strict
rule in this type case, it does allow an attested instrument to in-
corporate a non-holographic document by reference and become
a part of the testamentary disposition.
3 0
The leading writers in the field of Wills are also in conflict as
to whether an holographic instrument should incorporate a non-
holographic instrument. Professor Atkinson 3' states that the doc-
trine of incorporation is as applicable to holographic as to ordi-
nary wills. It is his opinion that the sounder view is that even if
the extrinsic document sought to be incorporated is not written
by the testator it can nevertheless be incorporated by a holo-
graphic will. Professor Mechem 32 in discussing the rule of the
Sharp case concluded that it was sound from the standpoint of
analysis as well as from the standpoint of providing a tolerable
and working rule. In Page on Wills33 the rule is stated as follows:
The holographic will is an apparent, though not a real,
exception to the general rule that a codicil, if properly
executed, revives a prior will. Since a holographic will
must be entirely in the handwriting of the testator, a holo-
- Ky. REv. STAT. See. 894.040 provides that no will shall be valid unless it is
in writing with the name of the testator subscribed thereto by himself. If the
will is not wholly written by the testator, the subscription shall be made on the
will acknowledged by him in the presence of at least two credible witnesses.
805 Ky. 840, 204 S.W. 2d 867 (1947).
Id. at 842.
Daniel v. Tyler's Estate, supra note 20.
Atkinson, op. cit., supra note 20, at 892.
"Mechem, The Integration of Holographic Wills, 12 N. CAR. L. REv. 213,
229, 280 (1934).
12 PACE, WiuLs 14 (1941).
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graphic codicil, which is not attested, does not republish
a prior will which is not entirely in the handwriting of
the testator ...
It has been argued that, by analogy to the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference of unattested documents into attested
codicils, it follows logically that the doctrine should apply to holo-
graphic codicils.3 4 Further, since there is no statutory authoriza-
tion for incorporation by reference either in attested wills or holo-
graphic wills then there should be no bar to allow either to in-
corporate.35 It has also been urged that a testator should be able
to do by holographic will whatever he could do by an attested
will in a jurisdiction where holographic wills are validated gen-
erally by statutes.
3 6
Although the present state of the law is in conflict on this
matter, it is submitted that the rule followed by the courts in
Kentucky and Mississippi represents the better view. Although
an attested document can incorporate an unattested instrument,
it does not necessarily follow that an unattested written instru-
ment can incorporate another document that has not been writ-
ten by the testator. In the former instance, the testator by having
the incorporating document attested has declared that the ex-
trinsic papers are his will, or at least his act. Thus, he has removed
any doubt as to his intention to incorporate an extrinsic document
and any doubts of fraud. On the other hand, where the testator
merely writes a codicil in his own handwriting and it attempts to
incorporate an instrument that he did not write or any purported
will invalid for want of proper execution, there is even less assur-
ance that he prepared the extrinsic instrument attempted to be
probated, assented to its contents, or that he did it under his own
free will. If the extrinsic document is in the handwriting of the
testator, the authenticity of the testator's intention is manifested
by his own handwriting. To hold otherwise, will permit a writing
which is not entirely in the handwriting of the testator to be ad-
mitted to probate without any attestation.
The statute prescribing the manner of executing a will was
designed not only to lessen the opportunity for imposition and
- 16 TENN. L. Rgv. 741, 745 (1941). See also 57 Am. Jutn. 434 (1948).
' Supra note 23. See also 1 RussEr.L AND Mmunr-, KEmUcKY PROBATE PRAc-
TicE 333 (1955).
' Supra note 10, at 434.
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fraud but also to insure that a testator would be clearly cognizant
of the testamentary dispositions he was then making. The re-
quirement that a will be wholly written by the testator makes
certain that he was expressing what he intended. On the other
hand, the requirement of attesting witnesses attaches to the testa-
mentary act a certain formality which insures that the testator had
read and understood the writing prepared by another as being
his last will and testament.
JAMEs LEviN
